"A War We Just Might Win"

A friend e-mailed this to me. It's an op-ed in today's New York Times by two defense scholars who have been critical of the Bush Administration's conduct of the Iraq War. It's not an OC-specific issue, but after yet another anti-war editorial today from the defeatists at the OC Register, I wanted to submit this for our readers' consideration. I hope the weak sisters and defeatists in the Congress who seem poised to press the bug-out button will also read it and perhaps re-consider their haste to run for the exit in a panicked rush.

A War We Just Might Win
By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK

VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.
 
After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.
 
Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.
 
Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.
 
In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks — all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups — who were now competing to secure his friendship.
 
In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.
 
We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.
 
But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).
 
In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.
 
In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.
 
The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.
 
In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
 
These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.
 
Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.
 
In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.
 
Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.
 
In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.
 
How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.
 
Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.

Comments

[Jubal]

RP:

I think it's pretty clear what the Administration objective is: a democratic Iraqi government that functions reasonably well and can ultimately provide for its own internal and external security. The strategic goal is that a stable, democratic Iraq will lead to a more democratic, stable Middle East.

And that will likely necessitate an American troop presence of some kind for many years -- and that was discussed and foreseen even before the invasion. We still have troops in Japan more than 60 years after they surrendered and in Korea 54 years after the armistice.

War critics get upset because wars don't follow a set sequence like instructions for assembling a bike.

[redperegrine]

Well, Jubal, I'm not sure how "functions reasonably well" is going to occur when we can't get our new democratic confreres to give up sectarian violence against one another.

With the exception of democracy the goals you described pretty much existed before the invasion - certainly more so than will exist in the foreseeable future. Which leaves us with democracy. The President latched onto this objective fairly early on when the WMDs failed to show up, even though conservatives have traditionally eschewed human rights and nation-building as reasons for foreign intervention.

Well, that's all in the past now, although the voters will remember, and the party is likely to get thrashed in '08 (only Hilary can save us).

For the future, I take the point that it's problematic to just leave the mess behind us and hit the road - things will really get interesting in Iraq then. Yet I remain unpersuaded that we have the kind of interest in Iraq that would justify a long, increasingly costly occupation.

[Jubal]

I'm not sure how "functions reasonably well" is going to occur when we can't get our new democratic confreres to give up sectarian violence against one another.

Do you want the sectarian violence to vanish instantly? Or would you be OK with a gradual decline as internal security improves?

With the exception of democracy the goals you described pretty much existed before the invasion

You also had a brutal dictatorship that was trying -- but failing, as it turned out -- to acquires weapons with which to harm this country. But Saddam's secret police did ensure internal "security" alright.

Which leaves us with democracy. The President latched onto this objective fairly early on when the WMDs failed to show up, even though conservatives have traditionally eschewed human rights and nation-building as reasons for foreign intervention.

That's not true. It's astounding how quickly people forget events of just a few years ago. WMDs were never the sole reason, and democratizing Iraq -- and in the long-term the Middle East -- was always part of the rational for going to war in order to better secure America from future 9/11s by changing the nature of the Middle East.

[Bladerunner]

Jubal---What's next--North Korea? They DO have weapons of mass destruction, they don't have democracy and providing hegemony on the Korean Peninsula could be an attractive goal. Candidate Bush said he would not engage in nation building and there were good reasons for taking that position. President Bush has done the opposite and bogged us down and managed to ensure that just about everyone but the Kurds and those drawing a government paycheck hate our guts. And the Kurds would hate us if it wasn't for the threat from Turkey. Are you suggesting that whenever we like we can invade countries in order to establish a democracy there--and invade them again or destabalize them if we don't like the results of that democracy?

Be careful what you wish for. You and the Bush Administration want a democratic Iraq? It's more likely to result in an anti-American, pro-Tehran government dominated by Shiites. Think of the last elections in Palestine and the ascendency of Hamaas. Now when the Iraq Government joins Iran in cutting the flow of oil to the West to squeeze us on Israel will you then call for the U.S. to overthrow the democratically elected government of Iraq?

I like your McClellan point. I have pndered whether staying the course would turn things around. No more then the French, or the Americans for that matter, could have turned things around in Indochina. The difference though is that Lincoln was fighting a war in OUR country. Trying to keep various factions apart in Iraq while newly minted terrorists use our troops for target practice doesn't work in a country that really doesn't want us there. Japan and South Korea wanted and still want our troops. Had our troops had to fight in Tokyo and Seoul against the people we allegedly were there trying to protect like they have had to in Bagdhad we would have left those countries long ago.

And yes, I withdraw the accusation you're trying to shift the focus away from the variety of disasters befalling the GOP of late. It happens with a good portion of the Right but I think your really believe in this charge up the Balaclava Heights--its just the majority of the country doesn't.

[redperegrine]

"It's astounding how quickly people forget events of just a few years ago."

No it's not astounding. People are forever bending and reshaping their recollections as their partisan positions or interests seem to require.

[redperegrine]

Balaclava!!??

BR, you'd better watch out. Obscure references to the Crimean War may earn you membership in the much-despised Intellectual Set!

[Bladerunner]

Right, the ones that figured out that by election day Gettysburg and Vicksburg had made Lincoln a lock, McClellan a dead duck and the end of the Civil War just a matter of a little controlled fires between Atlanta and Savannah and a chase through the Virginia countryside.

[Jubal]

Uh, BR -- Gettysburg and Vicksburg were in July 1863.

The Lincoln-McClellan election was in November 1864.

[Bladerunner]

I was so close RP.....I could have been a contender for the dreaded Intellectual set. Instead, I'm no better then a nattering nabob of negativism.

But Jubal, as I beat my historical retreat...don't you think though that the Vicksburg-Gettysburg defeats doomed the South, turned the tide and made Lincoln's re-election a foregone conclusion? Even mcClellan didn't support the anti-war platform of the Dems. I don't think RP and I would have been voting Democrat that year.

[redperegrine]

Well BR, don't give up. Maybe I can get you an auxiliary membership, or something.

The fall of Atlanta in the summer of '64 made it a shoo-in for Lincoln (after all there were no Southern states voting for the Democrat ticket). After that it was a to be pincer deal between Sherman coming up from the south to meet Grant who was beseiging Petersburg and then moving south after Richmond fell.

[RHackett]

The Iraqis are not indifferent. Their security forces are getting better and more effective all the time. Even war critics like O'Hanlon and Pollack admit as much.

Great news. Then you should have no problem with our troops being given a leave commensurate with the vacation the Iraqi parliament is taking. Our troops could be redeployed to the coastal areas of the Red Sea and work on their tans. Recharge their batteries so to speak and come back rested and ready to resume the fight when the parliament reconvenes.

[tylerh]

Jubal wrote:

Funny how often one more charge does break the enemy's will. If you and BR had been in command of the Normans at Hastings, William would never have acquired the sobriquet "Conquerer."

Jubal,
If Norman position during the afternoon of the Battle of Hastings is the correct model for current US situation in Iraq than the US is probably going to lose.

Let me expand.

Before that "final charge" the Normans were not having a good day at Hastings. They needed to win, soon, because they were far from supplies, not on good terms with the locals, and a better Saxon army was on the way. Anything less then victory before sundown probably meant failure. Yet the Normans and their associated pseudo-mercenaries had failed to break the Saxon line despite repeated attempts.

Lacking alternatives, William the Bastard gathered what cavalry he could and made one more charge. Harold was rallying his troops, as he had done so many times before, when the pivotal event occurred: some unknown archer placed an arrow in Harold's eye socket, depriving the Saxons of their rallying point. Harold's demise meant not only the loss of the battle, but also of the Kingdom.

So, Jubal, whose eye socket do you think American forces need to pierce to turnaround this Strategically Unfavorable and, thus far, Tactically Losing situation in Iraq?